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The ICCPR and the regional human rights conventions do not explicitly prohibit 
discrimination based on sexual orientation, or provide the right to marry and have 
a family for same-sex couples, thus leaving an open margin of interpretation to 
their judicial and quasi-judicial enforcement bodies. However, regional courts and 
the Human Rights Committee (HRC) jurisprudence seems to have followed a path 
of convergence rather than fragmentation. This article will analyse the case-law of 
the regional judicial bodies and of the HRC on the matter through the lens of the 
prohibition of discrimination, assessing how such convergence has been reached 
and evaluating its nature. The analysis will reveal that beneath a seeming trend of 
convergence in the case outcomes , there are signs of a strong point of divergence 
and many threats of future fragmentation. In particular, there is a deep contrast 
between the European and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in terms of 
prohibited discrimination based on sexual orientation. Moreover, the convergence 
reached among regional human rights bodies and the HRC hides vague and highly 
debated concepts and definitions on sensitive topics like marriage and adoption. 






People face human rights abuses due to their sexual orientation everywhere in the 
world. The debate on the extent and interpretation of sexual orientation rights is 
particularly intense due to the strong relevance of cultural, social and religious concerns.1 
The  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)  and  the  
regional  human  rights  conventions  do  not  explicitly prohibit discrimination based on 
sexual orientation, or establish the right to marry and have a family for same-sex couples, 
thus leaving an open margin of interpretation to their judicial and quasi- judicial 
enforcement bodies.2 However, regional courts and the UN Human Rights Committee 
(HRC) seem to have followed, at least on the surface, the path of convergence rather than 
fragmentation.3 This convergence has been identified for the lack of obvious 
fragmentation, because there are no two cases based on comparable facts where these 
bodies have rendered judgments with contrasting outcomes. Indeed, the term 
fragmentation defines the phenomenon that arises when two courts (or quasi-judicial 
bodies) seized of the same (or similar) matter render contrasting judgments.4 
The debate on fragmentation and convergence in international human rights law 
(IHRL) is still an ongoing matter of discussion. After some initial concerns that judicial 
 
1 Ignacio Saiz, ‘Bracketing Sexuality: Human Rights and Sexual Orientation: A Decade of 
Development and Denial at the UN’ (2004) 7 Health and Human Rights 48; Holning Lau, ‘Sexual 
Orientation : Testing the Universality of International Human Rights Law’ (2004) 71 The 
University of Chicago Law Review 1689; Amy Adamczyk and Cassady Pitt, ‘Shaping Attitudes 
about Homosexuality: The Role of Religion and Cultural Context’ (2009) 38 Social Science 
Research 338; Darren E Sherkat and others, ‘Religion, Politics, and Support for Same-Sex 
Marriage in the United States, 1988-2008’ (2011) 40 Social Science Research 167.  
2 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) (New York, 16 December 1966) 
999 UNTS 171 and 1057 UNTS 407 
3 Jack Donnelly, ‘Non-Discrimination and Sexual Orientation: Making a Place for Sexual 
Minorities in the Global Human Rights Regime’ in Peter Baehr, Cees Flinterman and Mignon 
Senders (eds), Innovation and Inspiration: Fifty Years of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences 1999); Michael O’Flaherty and John 
Fisher, ‘Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity and International Human Rights Law: 
Contextualising the Yogyakarta Principles’ (2008) 8 Human Rights Law Review 207; Lau (n 1). 
4 Philippa Webb, International Judicial Integration and Fragmentation (OUP 2013). 
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fragmentation was spreading within IHRL, commentators now tend to agree on the fact 
that regional and international human rights bodies have adopted a path of convergence 
and harmonisation of their case-law rather than fragmentation.5 Nevertheless, sometimes 
this convergence is only temporary and fragile, merely based on the impossibility of a 
comparison due to the lack of similar cases before different bodies. Judicial fragmentation 
may have particularly negative consequences for the human rights bodies, the potential 
victims and for the whole IHRL system of protection.6 For instance, it may threat the 
unity, coherence and consistency of the human rights legal order by challenging the 
principle of universality or it may question the legitimacy of human rights judicial and 
quasi-judicial bodies. On the other hand, it should also be acknowledged that 
fragmentation may sometimes produce positive outcomes, such as the progressive 
development of international human rights law, capable of answering to the changing 
needs of society.7 Therefore, a careful analysis of existing or highly probable situations 
of fragmentation is recommended, assessing the potential outcomes and impact to better 
respond to the eventual negative consequences of fragmentation. 
In light of the above, this article aims at assessing and evaluating the nature of the 
convergence between regional systems and the HRC on sexual orientation rights, 
identifying the possible hints of fragmentation. Several scholars have explored the 
 
5 Marjan Ajevski, Fragmentation in International Human Rights Law: Beyond Conflict of Law 
(Routledge 2015); Carla Buckley, Alice Donald and Philip Leach (eds), Toward Convergence in 
International Human Rights Law: Approaches of Regional and International Systems 
(Brill/Nijhoff 2016). 
6 Pierre-Marie Dupuy, ‘The Danger of Fragmentation or Unification of the International Legal 
System and the International Court of Justice’ (1999) 31 NYU Journal of International Law and 
Politics 791; Webb (n 4); Ajevski (n 5); Georges Abi-Saab, ‘Fragmentation or Unification: Some 
Concluding Remarks’ (1999) 31 International Law and Politics 919. 
7 Anne-Charlotte Martineau, ‘The Rhetoric of Fragmentation: Fear and Faith in International 
Law’ (2009) 22 Leiden Journal of International Law 1; Yuval Shani, ‘International Human Rights 
Bodies and the Little-Realized Threat of Fragmentation’ (2016) Hebrew University of Jerusalem 
Legal Studies Research Paper Series No. 16-06. 
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protection granted to sexual minorities and lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender 
(LGBT) communities by international human rights law, but they have limited their 
analysis to one or two jurisdictions.8 This article departs from the existing literature and 
adopts a holistic view on the matter, taking into consideration all the main human rights 
regional systems and the UN Human Rights Committee. In line with the most recent 
contribution of Frans Viljoen,9 this study will use a comparative method focusing on the 
case-law (or the reasons for the lack of it) of the three main regional human rights systems, 
the European, the Inter-American and the African system, as well as the HRC. The study 
will deal with the prohibition of discrimination based on sexual orientation and will 
examine the specific substantive rights, whose enjoyment is often restricted to same-sex 
couples, through the lens of discrimination. Indeed, as a key right that regulates the 
enjoyment and protection of any other rights, the prohibition of discrimination has always 
been invoked when addressing sexual orientation rights violations. Considering the 
extremely low number of cases on the matter brought before the African Commission, 
the Inter-American Court and the HRC, all the cases related to sexual orientation before 
these three bodies will be examined. However, due to the high number of cases brought 
before the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) on matters of sexual orientation, 
only the most relevant cases have been selected for the purposes of this study. 
 
8 O’Flaherty and Fisher (n 3); Donnelly (n 3); Saiz (n 1); Lau (n 1); James D Wilets, ‘International 
Human Rights Law and Sexual Orientation’ (1994) 18 Hastings International and Comparative 
Law Review 731; John M Finnis, ‘Law, Morality and “Sexual Orientation”’ (1994) 69 Notre 
Dame Law Review; Douglas Sanders, ‘Human Rights and Sexual Orientation in International 
Law’ (2002) 25 International Journal of Public Administration 13; Emma Mittelstaedt, 
‘Safeguarding the Rights of Sexual Minorities : The Incremental and Legal Approaches to 
Enforcing International Human Rights Obligations’ (2008) 9 Chicago Journal of International 
Law 353. 
9 Frans Viljoen, ‘Minority Sexual Orientation as a Challenge to the Harmonised Interpretation of 
International Human Rights Law’ in Carla M Buckley, Alice Donald and Philip Leach (eds), 
Toward Convergence in International Human Rights Law (Brill/Nijhoff 2016). 
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Following this analysis, the article will conclude that it is possible to identify some 
elements that may lead to a potential fragmentation between some of the regional and 
international bodies. This is particularly true for the understanding of some key notions 
such as what constitutes a discriminatory treatment, what constitutes a family and 
whether, in general, there should be a sharp prohibition of discrimination based on sexual 
orientation. 
2. The Prohibition of Discrimination on the Ground of Sexual 
Orientation 
 
Human rights violations related to sexual orientation derive from a discriminatory 
treatment that prevents or diminishes the enjoyment of individuals’ rights on the basis of 
their sexual orientation.10 Discrimination based on sexual orientation could be defined as 
‘treating differently, without an objective and reasonable justification, persons in 
analogous, or relevantly similar, situations” due to their sexual orientation.11 Similarly, 
an equal treatment that has an adverse or disparate impact on people according to their 
sexual orientation still amounts to discrimination, although indirectly. While the facts of 
the abuse may raise claims under other substantial rights, the principle of non-
discrimination is always decisive in regulating such issues. Social life is full of many 
kinds of legitimate differences in treatment, aiming at protecting and safeguarding some 
categories of people and ensuring the enjoyment of their rights. However, if this different 
treatment becomes public and invidious, depriving certain groups from the legitimate 
enjoyment of their rights, then it is prohibited by international human rights law.12 
 
10 Sandra Fredman, Discrimination Law (OUP 2011) 86–93. 
11Kiyutin v Russia, Application No. 2700/10, (ECtHR, 10 March 2011), 59. 
12 Fredman, Discrimination Law (n 10). 
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All core human rights instruments, from the Universal Declaration and the ICCPR 
at the  international  level  to  the  regional  human  rights  Charters  and  Conventions,  
do  not envisage ‘sexual orientation’ as a prohibited ground for discrimination, leaving 
wide margin of interpretation to the adjudicatory bodies. However, regional bodies and 
the Human Rights Committee did somehow converge in filling this gap and providing 
judicial protection in case of discrimination based on sexual orientation. Sexual 
orientation does not have a universally agreed upon definition in legal documents, but 
one may consider it as ‘each person’s capacity for profound emotional, affectional and 
sexual attraction to, and intimate and sexual relations with, individuals of a different 
gender or the same gender or more than one gender”.13 The present article will adopt this 
expression, and it can be understood to include all cases dealing with alleged violations 
of human rights on the basis of the individual’s homosexuality, heterosexuality or 
bisexuality.  
States have adopted completely different approaches to sexual orientation rights, 
from criminalising any homosexual activity to granting same-sex couples all the rights 
enjoyed by heterosexual couples. The signing of the Yogyakarta Principles on the 
Application of International Human Rights Law in relation to Sexual Orientation and 
Gender Identity14 was an important step for identifying the international human rights 
obligations states should bear in relation to LGBT communities.15 In addition to the 
Yogyakarta Principles, regional and international bodies made several efforts to protect 
 
13 Yogyakarta Principles-Principles on the Application of International Human Rights Law in 
relation to Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity, March 2007, available at 
http://www.yogyakartaprinciples.org/, accessed 11th June 2017 (hereinafter Yogyakarta 
Principle), Preamble. 
14ibid. 
15 O’Flaherty and Fisher (n 3). The acronym LGBT stands for ‘Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and 
Transgender” but will be used in this article with a particular reference to lesbians, gays and 
bisexuals who are the most discriminated individuals for their sexual orientation. 
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people against discrimination based on sexual orientation. However, the principles 
remain at a soft-law level and their impact on the judicial application of international and 
domestic legislations is limited16, thus not establishing legal obligations upon member 
states. For instance, in 2011, the UN Human Rights Council adopted the first resolution 
on sexual orientation, being the first UN body to take an official position on the issue,17 
followed by a dedicated report of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human 
Rights.18 Within the Council of Europe framework, where countries like Russia and 
Moldova still condemn homosexuality, worth recalling is the 1981 Parliamentary 
Assembly Recommendation No.924, which calls upon states to decriminalise 
homosexual acts19, and the 2010 recommendation of the Committee of Ministers, urging 
states to adopt and effectively implement legislative and other measures to prevent 
discrimination based on sexual orientation.20 In the Americas, the OAS General 
Assembly adopted from 2008 to 2012 a series of resolutions on human rights and sexual 
orientation, requesting states to incrementally protect the rights of sexual minorities and 
fight against discrimination based on sexual orientation.21 Moreover, in 2013, the Inter-
American Commission decided to establish a Rapporteurship on LGBTI rights to further 
strengthen the regional promotion and protection of human rights. Finally, within the 
 
16 Michael O’Flaherty, ‘The Yogyakarta Principles at Ten’ (2015) 33 Nordic Journal of Human 
Rights 280. 
17 UN HRC Resolution on Human rights, sexual orientation and gender identity, HRC/RES/17/19, 
17 June 2011 
18 Discriminatory laws and practices and acts of violence against individuals based on their sexual 
orientation and gender identity, A/HRC/19/41, 14 July 2011. 
19 Recommendation of the Parliamentary Assembly on Discrimination against homosexuals No. 
924, Doc. 4755, 1 October 1981. 
20 Recommendation of the Committee of Ministers to member states on measures to combat 
discrimination on ground of sexual orientation or gender identity, CM/Rec(2010)5, 31 March 
2010.  
21 Human Rights, Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity, OAS AG/RES 2435(XXXVIII-O/080, 
3 June 2008; OAS AG/RES 2504(XXXXIX-O/09), 4 June 2009, OAS AG/RES 2600(XL-O/10), 




African system sexual orientation rights has been more controversial issue. The 
Organisation of African Unity or the African Union have not addressed the matter of 
sexual orientation yet. However, the African Commission adopted in 2014 a resolution 
On Protection against Violence and other Human Rights Violations against Persons on 
the Basis of their Real or Imputed Sexual Orientation or Gender Identity, mentioning for 
the first time sexual orientation issues.  
3. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
and the Human Rights Committee 
Article 2(1) of the ICCPR reads:  
[e]ach State Party […]undertakes to respect and to ensure  to  all  
individuals  […] the  rights  recognized  in  the  present  Covenant,  
without distinction  of  any kind,  such  as  race,  colour,  sex,  language,  
religion,  political  or  other opinion, national or social origin,  property, 
birth or other status.22   
Similarly, article 26 provides that:  
[a]ll persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any 
discrimination to the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law 
shall prohibit any discrimination   and   guarantee   to   all   persons   
equal   and   effective   protection   against discrimination on any ground 
such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, 
national or social origin, property, birth or other status. 23  
In interpreting the letter of these articles applied to cases of discrimination based on 
sexual orientation, the Human Rights Committee took a clear stance in filling the 
 
22 ICCPR, art 2. 
23 ibid, art 26. 
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normative gap. In Toonen v Australia,24 the first case on the issue brought before the HRC 
in 1994,25 the Committee unanimously concluded that the criminalisation of same-sex 
relations violated the principle of non-discrimination. Indeed, the HRC noted that ‘the 
reference to “sex” in articles 2(1) and 26 is to be taken as including sexual orientation’.26 
From this moment, the HRC has persistently held that discrimination based on 
sexual orientation should always be considered as ‘a suspect category in terms of 
enjoyment of Covenant rights and, more generally, for equality before and equal 
protection of the law’.27  
However, in the subsequent cases, the Committee relied on the more general 
notion that ‘everyone’ or ‘all human beings’ should enjoy the same rights.28 Reading ‘sex’ 
as including also ‘sexual orientation’ as ground of discrimination has positive and 
negative aspects. On the one hand, considering the importance of the ‘sex’ category in 
the Covenant and in any anti-discrimination provisions, this radical and provocative29 
interpretation elevates the status of discrimination based on sexual orientation, and 
potentially extends the prohibition of discrimination to all legal instruments where there 
is a stated prohibition of discrimination based on sex. Moreover, as American scholars 
have largely discussed, considering discrimination based on sexual orientation as falling 
under discrimination based on sex is particularly correct since the former is just another 
way to maintain a hierarchy between gender and gender roles.30 On the other hand, this 
 
24 Toonen v Australia, Communication No.488/1992, (HRC, 31 March 1994). 
25  Hertzberg and Others v Finland, Communication No. 61/1979, (HRC, 2 April 1982). While 
tackling the issue of sexual orientation, the complaint focused on the violation of freedom of 
expression. 
26 Toonen (n 24) 8.7. 
27Michael O’Flaherty and John Fisher (n 3). 
28  Joslin et al.v New Zealand, Communication No.902/1999,(HRC,17 July 2002). 
29 Jack Donnelly (n 3) 21. 
30Andrew Koppelmann, ‘Why Discrimination Against Lesbians and Gay Men Is Sex 
Discrimination’ (1994) 69 New York University Law Review 197; Sylvia Law, ‘Homosexuality 
and the Social Meaning of Gender’ (1998) Wisconsin Law Review 187.  
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assimilation may be considered incorrect because the drafters of the ICCPR intended the 
prohibition on sex discrimination to address the subordination of women; treating sexual 
orientation discrimination as sex discrimination conflicts with this original intent. 
Moreover, it does not take into consideration the differences between the suffering of 
women and sexual minorities.31 
All the cases after Toonen adopt the same approach of condemnation of 
discrimination based on sexual orientation, though with some differences due to the facts 
of the case and the nature of the other rights claims.  
In Young v Australia32 and X v Colombia,33 the Committee found discrimination 
in the distinction between same-sex partners excluded from pension benefits that were 
otherwise granted to unmarried heterosexual partners. In both cases, the Committee found 
that the states failed to prove that the difference in treatment was reasonable and 
objective, thus violating article 26.34 However, in X. v Colombia, a dissenting opinion of 
two members of the HRC pointed out that ‘a couple of the same sex does not constitute a 
family within the meaning of the Covenant and cannot claim benefits that are based on a 
conception of the family comprising individuals of different sex’.35 This strong position, 
even if marginal and representative of the opinion of only two members, is a significant 
step backward in the development of a progressive concept of family, key for the 
enjoyment of sexual orientation rights. Indeed, it showed that even on the basic notion of 
family there is no unanimity within the HRC on whether it should be inclusive of 
homosexual couples. 
 
31 Jack Donnelly (n 3) 21. 
32 Young v Australia, Communication No. 941/2000 (HRC, 6 August 2003). 
33 X v Colombia, Communication No. 1361/2005 (HRC, 30 March 2007). 
34 Ibid, 7.2 and Young (n 32), 10.4. 
35 ibid, dissenting opinion. 
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Differently, in Joslin v New Zealand,36 the HRC did not find any violation of article 2 or 
26 in the case of the denial of a marriage licence to a same-sex couple. The right to marry 
is protected, under the ICCPR, by article 23: ‘[…] The right of men and women of 
marriageable age to marry and to found a family shall be recognized’.37  
The letter of the article seems quite strict on who can enter in a marriage and, so 
far, the HRC has not extended its interpretation to same-sex couples. In Joslin v New 
Zealand38, the Committee briefly concluded that the ICCPR does not protect the right to 
marry for same-sex couple, since the use of the terminology ‘men and women’ in article 
23, rather than the gender-neutral terminology used elsewhere in the ICCPR (like 
‘everyone’ or ‘all persons’), ‘has been consistently and uniformly understood as 
indicating that[…]marriage [is] only the union between a man and a woman’.39 This 
categorical assertion clashes with the Committee’s position in its General Comments that 
‘marriage’ and ‘the family’ are to be understood as continuously evolving concepts that 
apply to a diversity of arrangements across cultures.40 
However, an individual concurring opinion of two members of the HRC left the 
door open to a different interpretation, by affirming that the Committee’s  
[c]onclusion should not be read as a general statement that differential 
treatment between married couples and same-sex couples not allowed 
under the law to marry would never amount to a violation of Article 26. 
On the contrary, the Committee's jurisprudence supports the position that 
such differentiation may very well, depending on the circumstances of a 
 
36 Joslin (n 28). 
37 ICCPR, art 23. 
38 Joslin (n 28). 
39 ibid, 8.2. 
40 UN Human Rights Committee (HRC), CCPR General Comment No. 19: Article 23, 27 July 
1990, 2-4; UN Human Rights Committee (HRC), CCPR General Comment No. 28: Article 3, 29 
March 2000, 23-27; Ignacio Saiz (n 1). 
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concrete case, amount to prohibited discrimination.41 
4.         The European System 
The European Court of Human Rights has considered issues related to 
discrimination based on sexual orientation in several cases.  Article 14 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), in line with ICCPR article 26, states that  
[t]he enjoyment of the rights and freedoms […]shall be secured without 
discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, 
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association 
with a national minority, property, birth or other status.42  
The abundant case-law on sexual orientation rights is helpful in understanding the 
approach of the ECtHR toward discrimination based on sexual orientation. The ECtHR, 
in contrast to the HRC, has never found it necessary to discuss whether discrimination 
based on sexual orientation derives from the grounds of ‘sex’ or ‘other status’ or 
otherwise.43  
For instance, in Salgueiro da Silva Mouta v Portugal, the ECtHR stated that 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation was not acceptable under the ECHR.44 
In L. and V. v Austria and S. v Austria45, it  considered the differentiation of the age of 
consent for heterosexual or homosexual relations discriminatory, establishing that ‘[j]ust 
 
41 Joslin (n 28), Individual opinion of Committee members Mr. Rajsoomer Lallah and Mr. Martin 
Scheinin. 
42 Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
(ECHR) 1950, art 14. 
43 Sutherland v United Kingdom, Application no 25186/94, (ECtHR, 1 July 1997). 
44 Salgueiro da Silva Mouta v Portugal, Application No. 33290/96 (ECtHR, 21 December 1999), 
36. 
45 L. and V. v Austria, Applications no 39392/98 and 39829/98 (ECtHR, 9 January 2003). 
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like differences based on sex[…]differences based on sexual orientation require 
particularly serious reasons by way of justification’46 for the purpose of article 14. 
A more detailed analysis of the case-law of the ECtHR could improve our 
understanding of the approach of the ECtHR. Due to the huge number of cases rendered 
on the matter, I will analyse three categories in particular, namely the right to marriage 
or to other relationship registration, parental authority and adoption and social protection.  
4.1 Right to marriage or other relationship registration 
In its landmark cases on the right to marry for same-sex couples, the ECtHR 
adopted a cautious approach in extending such a right beyond the traditional conception 
of marriage. For instance, in Christine Goodwin v United Kingdom,47 it ruled that the 
right to marry is not limited to persons who are biologically of the opposite sex, opening 
up the possibility of an extension to same-sex marriage. However, when deciding cases 
specifically concerning same-sex marriage, the ECtHR adopted a different stance.  
The first case on the matter was Schalk and Kopf v. Austria,48 concerning the 
denial of permission to marry for a homosexual couple. The applicants claimed that they 
suffered from violation of their right to marry in conjunction with the prohibition of non-
discrimination based on sexual orientation. In examining the case, the ECtHR recognised 
an evolution of social attitudes toward same-sex couples in many member states 
considering cohabiting same-sex couples living in a stable de facto relationship as falling 
within the notion of family life.49 Nonetheless, it adopted a similar approach as the HRC 
in observing that article 12 of the ECHR establishes the right to marry between ‘a man 
 
46 ibid 37. The Austrian legislation provided that for heterosexual relations the age of consent was 
14 while for homosexual relationships was 18.  
47 Christine Goodwin v the United Kingdom, Application No. 28957/95 (ECtHR, 11 July 2002). 
48 Schalk and Kopf v. Austria, Application no. 30141/04 (ECtHR, 22 November 2010). 
49 ibid, 93-95; David J Harris and others, Law of the European Convention on Human Rights 
(OUP 2014) 804. 
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and a woman’ and does not provide such right for ‘everyone’ or ‘all human beings’. The 
ECtHR argued that marriage is an institution deeply rooted in local societies and its 
regulation should be left to the single member states. Moreover, the ECtHR noticed that 
there was no European consensus on gay marriage, at the time only 6 out of 47 member 
states had adopted domestic legislation allowing for gay marriage. In light of this, while 
recognising the possibility of interpreting article 12 as allowing same-sex marriage, the 
ECtHR concluded that there was no violation of the right to marry, since article 12 does 
not impose any obligation upon member states to provide the right to marry for same-sex 
couples.50  
The ECtHR adopted the same reasoning and conclusion was in the only other case 
on the issue, Chapin and Charpentier v France51, decided in 2016. Here, it confirmed its 
position and considered that the regional consensus on marriage for same-sex couples had 
not yet been reached, even if the number of member states who adopted national 
legislation allowing same-sex marriage had  increased to 11.  
Lastly, in 2012, Miss Orlandi and others 52 filed a complaint against Italy for the 
refusal of marriage recognition of four Italian same-sex couples. The ECtHR is still 
considering the case and it will be interesting to see whether it will change its approach 
now that the number of member states that recognise same-sex marriage is increasing.53 
Before concluding this section, it is worth mentioning the landmark case of the 
Strasbourg court on recognition of same-sex partnerships, Oliari and others v Italy.54 
When it comes to same-sex partnerships that do not amount to marriage, the approach of 
 
50 Schalk and Kopf (n 48) 57-60. 
51 Chapin and Charpentier v France, Application No. 40183/07 (ECtHR, 9 June 2016). 
52 Orlandi and Others v Italy, Application No. 26431/12, 26742/12, 44057/12 and 60088/12. 
53Data available on the website of ILGA Europe at http://old.ilga-
europe.org/home/guide_europe/country_by_country, last accessed 22nd February 2017. 
54 Oliari and Others v Italy, Application No. 18766/11 and  36030/11(ECtHR, 21 July 2015) 
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the ECtHR has been far more protective for the applicants’ rights. The case concerned six 
Italian male citizens claiming that the absence of any legal provision allowing them to 
marry or to access to any form of civil union was amounting to discrimination based on 
their sexual orientation together with violation of their right to family and private life. 
The ECtHR held that Italy did not respect the applicants’ private and family life by 
denying them the opportunity ‘to enter into a civil union or registered partnership’.55 
Moreover, it considered that Italy had overstepped its margin of appreciation and that the 
lack of a legal framework recognising and protecting the applicants’ relationship violated 
article 8.56 However, as for the right to marry, the ECtHR remained very cautious 
recalling its previous ruling in Shalk and Kopf and allowing states to enjoy a wider margin 
of appreciation.57 This judgment represents a huge victory for LGBT rights because it 
establishes the right for same-sex couple to enter into civil partnerships, significantly 
reducing the state’s margin of appreciation on this matter. However, the ECtHR did not 
consider the alleged violation under article 14, thus not assessing whether Italy was 
treating the applicants in a discriminatory way by denying them the possibility to enter 
into a marriage or civil partnership. Moreover, it failed to make any progress in relation 
to the rights to marry for homosexual couples, when it emphasised that homosexual 
couples only have a right to enter in civil partnership and not to get married.58 
 
55 ibid, 164. 
56 ibid, 185. 
57 ibid, 189-194. 
58 Eduardo Savarese, “In margine al caso Oliari: ovvero di come il limbo italiano delle coppie 
omosessuali abbia violato gli obblighi positive dell’art. 8 CEDU” (2015) 3 Diritti Umani e Diritto 
Internazionale; Sabrina Ragone and Valentina Volpe, ‘An Emerging Right to a “Gay” Family 
Life? The Case Oliari v. Italy in a Comparative Perspective’ (2016) 17 German Law Journal.  
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4.2 Parental authority and adoption 
The first case where the ECtHR found a violation of article 14 based on sexual orientation 
was in 1999, in Salgueiro da Silva Mouta v Portugal.59 Here, the ECtHR considered that 
the denial of parental responsibility on the ground of the father’s sexual orientation was 
prohibited by the Convention. The ECtHR openly contested the position of the 
Portuguese Court that awarded exclusive parental responsibility to the mother on the 
assumption that homosexuality constitutes an abnormality and children should grow up 
in normal and traditional Portuguese families.60 According to the ECtHR, the Convention 
does not allow a distinction between a ‘normal’ and an ‘abnormal’ family and doing so 
on the basis of the sexual orientation of a parent amounts to a violation of the right to 
respect of family life in conjunction with the prohibition of discrimination based on 
sexual orientation.61  
Worth mentioning in this analysis is also E.B. v France62, a case concerning the 
complaint of a woman who saw her adoption request denied on the ground of her life-
style as a lesbian living with another woman. The ECtHR here found a violation of article 
14 in conjunction with article 8 because the sexual orientation of the applicant was the 
determining factor in refusing her request for adoption, whereas heterosexual single 
individuals were allowed to adopt a child. To this end, it specified that the Convention 
does not provide the right to ‘found a family’ or to ‘adopt’ but it protects the family and 
private life, including the possibility to get an adoption. Moreover, in order to constitute 
a violation under article 14, the ECtHR underlined that ‘the reasons advanced for such a 
 
59 Salgueiro da Silva Mouta (n 44). 
60 ibid 34. 
61 ibid 35-36. 
62 E.B. v France, Application No. 43546/02 (ECtHR, 22 January 2008). 
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difference in treatment [should be] based solely on considerations regarding the 
applicant's sexual orientation.’63 
On the contrary, in Gas and Dubois v. France64, the ECtHR found no 
discrimination based on sexual orientation when dealing with the complaint of two 
cohabiting women for the refusal to Miss Gas to adopt the natural son of Miss Dubois. 
They claimed that this decision infringed their right to private and family life in a 
discriminatory manner. The ECtHR found no violation of article 8 in conjunction with 
article 14, considering the impossibility of comparing the situation of the applicants with 
that of heterosexual married couples.65 Indeed, domestic legislation prohibited a simple 
adoption order for unmarried heterosexual couples in a civil relationship, thus not creating 
any discrimination with same-sex couples in the same civil situation. In response to the 
applicants' argument that heterosexual couples do have the possibility of marriage if they 
want to adopt while same-sex couples do not, the ECtHR simply restated its position in 
Schalk and Kopf v Austria, recalling that there is no right to marry and that member states 
should enjoy a wide margin of appreciation on this matter.66  
Similar reasoning, focused on the impossibility to compare the situation of 
homosexual couples unable to marry and married heterosexual couples, was applied in X 
and Others v Austria.67 The case concerned the refusal to grant one partner the right to 
adopt the son of the other partner while living in a stable homosexual relationship, 
claiming a violation of article 8 and to be a victim of discrimination on the basis of their 
sexual orientation considering that adoption was granted to both married and unmarried 
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heterosexual couples. The ECtHR, in a highly debated judgment, held that there was no 
violation of article 14 in conjunction to article 8 when the situation of the applicants was 
compared to heterosexual married people.68 However, voting ten to seven, it found a 
violation of article 14 in conjunction with article 8 when the applicants were compared to 
unmarried heterosexual couples, who are indeed granted the possibility of step-child 
adoption.69 The ruling in favour of the applicant shows the willingness of the ECtHR to 
protect the rights of same-sex couples and aligns it to the case-law of other bodies. 
However, the fact that the decision was made with such a small majority means that there 
was a strong debate among the judges.  Furthermore, this case showed that an issue that 
had seemingly been established in other cases, namely the prohibition of discrimination 
based solely on sexual orientation, was challenged when the issue of adoption and the 
rights of children were at stake. 
4.3 Social protection 
The case-law of the ECtHR on social protection for same-sex couples is particularly 
interesting, showing different approaches when interpreting and applying articles 8 and 
14. In 2001, the ECtHR ruled on Mata Estevez v Spain,70 on the denial of a survivor’s 
pension to the de facto homosexual partners considered as a discriminatory act if 
compared to the treatment reserved to married heterosexual couples. It considered the 
application inadmissible and manifestly ill-founded since the eligibility criteria for the 
survivor’s pension that excluded homosexual couples were pursuing the legitimate aim 
of protecting the family based on marriage bonds. The difference of treatment between 
 
68 ibid 105-110.  
69 ibid 153. 
70 Mata Estevez v Spain, Application No. 56501/00 (ECtHR, 10 May 2001). 
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same-sex and heterosexual couple did not amount to discrimination, but rather fell within 
the state’s margin of appreciation.71  
The same position was reiterated in June 2016 when the ECtHR ruled on the very 
similar case Aldeguer Tomás v. Spain.72 The facts of the case were exactly the same as 
the previous case, with the only difference being the time frame. In 2005 Spain approved 
a law legalising same-sex marriage, thus removing any obstacles for a person to get the 
survivor’s pension of his partner regardless of his or her sexual orientation. However, the 
ECtHR confirmed its approach, finding no discriminatory treatment based on sexual 
orientation.73 In line with its case-law on the right to marry, the ECtHR held that states 
should enjoy a certain margin of appreciation when it comes to the timing of the 
introduction of legislative changes in the field of legal recognition of same-sex couples 
and the exact status conferred to them, considering this an area of evolving rights with no 
established regional consensus.74  
To the contrary, in all cases concerning the succession to a tenancy for the same-
sex partner of the deceased,75 the ECtHR found a violation of article 8 in conjunction with 
article 14 without granting the states any margin of appreciation. Similarly, in P.B. and 
J.S. v Austria76, the ECtHR held that domestic legislations considering as ‘dependants’ 
only a close relative of the insured person or a cohabitee of the opposite sex were 
discriminatory on the basis of sexual orientation.  
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5. The African System 
The African Charter on Human and People Rights contains a non-discrimination 
provision in line with other regional and international systems. Article 2 states that:  
Every individual shall be entitled to the enjoyment of the rights and 
freedoms[…]without distinction of any kind such as race, ethnic group, 
colour, sex, language, religion, political or any other opinion, national 
and social origin, fortune, birth or any status.77 
Little information is available on the applicability of this non-discrimination provision to 
sexual orientation cases, since the case-law on the matter is very scarce and neither the 
African Commission on Human and People’s Rights (ACommHPR) nor the African 
Court on Human and People’s Rights (ACtHPR) have issued any conclusion or judgment 
explicitly on discrimination based on sexual orientation. In light of that, we can only 
hypothetically conclude that discrimination based on sexual orientation in the African 
system should be generally prohibited and condemned, assuming that the African bodies 
will adopt the same approach of the HRC and the ECtHR when interpreting an almost 
identical provision to the one contained in the ICCPR and ECHR. 
However, if we look at the cases brought before of the Commission, some of them 
can be useful to understand the Commission’s approach. In 1994, Mr Courson brought a 
complaint against Zimbabwe claiming that the prohibition of sexual contacts between 
consenting adult homosexual men in private was a violation of his rights under the 
African Charter, including the right not to be discriminated on the basis of sexual 
orientation.78 The Commissioner acting as a rapporteur for the case openly declared that  
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because of the deleterious nature of homosexuality, the Commission seizes the 
opportunity to make a pronouncement on it. Although homosexuality and 
lesbianism are gaining recognition in certain parts of the world, this is not the case 
in Africa. Homosexuality offends the African sense of dignity and morality and 
is inconsistent with positive African values.79  
Not surprisingly, after such declaration, Mr Courson decided to withdraw the application 
and the Commission never ruled on the case.  
In 2006, this strong stance against sexual orientation rights was overruled by the 
Commission’s conclusions in Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum v Zimbabwe.80 Here, 
the Commission affirmed that the African Charter safeguards ‘equality of treatment for 
individuals irrespective of […] sexual orientation.’81 However, this opinion was 
expressed obiter, as the case did not concern the issue of sexual orientation as such. 
Moreover, the recent Resolution 275 On Protection against Violence and other Human 
Rights Violations against Persons on the Basis of their Real or Imputed Sexual 
Orientation or Gender Identity, adopted in 2014, showed an increasing interest and 
concern towards the rights of LGBT people.82 Still, the resolution does not mention the 
prohibition of discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, limiting its scope to the 
condemnation of violence against LGBT people.  
According to some scholars, these few developments should be considered as the 
assurance of the favourable approach of the ACommHPR, and potentially the ACtHPR, 
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toward the protection of LGBT people against discrimination based on their sexual 
orientation.83 However, this position appears quite optimistic and does not take into 
consideration that the ACommHPR has always adopted a circumstantial approach toward 
discrimination based on sexual orientation; it did recognise its prohibition under article 
2, but only in one case that was decided on other bases. Moreover, the ACommHPR 
decided not to make any reference to it in Resolution 275.  Moreover, it should be 
underlined that, in the African continent, thirty-one countries criminalise homosexual 
relationships, and four of them provide death penalty for such crime, and still the African 
Commission has not received yet any application from individuals denouncing 
discrimination based on sexual orientation after the failed Courson case in 1994. 
6. The Inter-American System 
The American Convention on Human Rights states in article 1 that all states parties 
should respect, ensure and protect the rights contained in the convention  
[w]ithout any discrimination for reasons of race, colour, sex, language, 
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, economic 
status, birth, or any other social condition.84 
In line with the other human rights instruments, there is no explicit reference to sexual 
orientation and room for interpretation is left under the ground of ‘sex’ or the very broad 
‘any other social condition’. 
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The Inter-American Court addressed the issue of discrimination based on sexual 
orientation in two landmark cases: Atala Riffo and Daughters v Chile85 and Angel Duque 
v Colombia.86In Atala Riffo v Chile, the IACtHR dealt with the case of a lesbian woman 
who was denied the custody of her three daughters on the basis that her sexual orientation 
had adverse effects on them. It held that  
[w]hen interpreting the words “any other social condition” […] it is 
always necessary to choose the alternative that is most favourable to the 
protection of the rights enshrined in said treaty, based on the principle 
of the rule most favourable to the human being.87  
Recalling the case-law of the ECtHR and the HRC on the matter88, the IACtHR concluded 
that  
[t]he sexual orientation of persons is a category protected by the 
Convention. Therefore, any regulation, act, or practice considered 
discriminatory based on a person’s sexual orientation is prohibited. 
Consequently, no domestic regulation, decision, or practice, whether by 
state authorities or individuals, may diminish or restrict, in any way 
whatsoever, the rights of a person based on his or her sexual 
orientation.89  
A crucial passage in the judgment shows the IACtHR’s understanding of the notion of 
discrimination based on sexual orientation. Indeed, the Court held that for proving  
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[t]hat a distinction in treatment has occurred, it is not necessary that the 
decision in its entirety be based “fundamentally and solely” on the 
person’s sexual orientation. It is sufficient to confirm that, to a certain 
extent, the person’s sexual orientation was taken into account, either 
explicitly or implicitly, in adopting a specific decision.90  
In stating such a position, the IACtHR explicitly referred to the following passage from 
the ECtHR’s ruling in E.B. v France: 91  
[n]otwithstanding the precautions taken […] to justify taking 
account the applicant's “lifestyle”, the inescapable conclusion is 
that her sexual orientation was consistently at the centre of 
deliberations in her regard and omnipresent at every stage of the 
administrative and judicial proceedings. […] The Court considers 
that the reference to the applicant's homosexuality was, if not 
explicit, at least implicit. The influence of the applicant's avowed 
homosexuality on the assessment of her application has been 
established and, having regard to the foregoing, was a decisive 
factor leading to the decision to refuse her authorization to adopt.92 
This reference appears odd in at least two respects. First, it does not seem to be the correct 
paragraph to substantiate and explain what the Inter-American Court actually says. 
Indeed, the IACtHR was establishing a lower threshold than the ECtHR for the definition 
of a discriminatory treatment, which does not need to be fundamentally and solely based 
on sexual orientation but it is enough to prove that to a certain extent this ground, even 
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implicitly, has been taken into account. The ECtHR, in the previous extract from E.B. v 
France, was clearly expressing a different principle. While it is true that the ECtHR held 
that ‘the reference to the applicant's homosexuality was, if not explicit, at least implicit’, 
the Court actually acknowledged that the sexual orientation of the applicant was 
‘consistently at the centre of deliberations in her regard and omnipresent at every stage 
of the administrative and judicial proceedings’ and that it ‘was a decisive factor’ in the 
decision of the domestic court.93 Therefore, it can not be concluded that the ECtHR in the 
aforementioned passage was agreeing with the IACtHR on the fact that a different 
treatment is discriminatory when is ‘confirmed that, to a certain extent, the sexual 
orientation of the applicant has been taken into account either explicitly or implicitly.’94 
The second respect of peculiarity of this example of judicial borrowing is that the 
Inter-American Court is referring to paragraph 88-89 of the judgment of the ECtHR that 
can not be extrapolated from the context. Indeed, in paragraph 93, the ECtHR explicitly 
stated that ‘if the reasons advanced for such a difference in treatment were based solely 
on considerations regarding the applicant's sexual orientation this would amount to 
discrimination under the Convention’.95 The ECtHR made clear that the sexual 
orientation of the applicant should be considered as the only justification for the different 
treatment in order for this to be considered discrimination under the Convention.  
Paragraph 93 is, therefore, clearly in contrast with the position of the IACtHR in Atala 
Riffo. In conclusion, the IACtHR referenced the ECtHR with the likely intent of 
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strengthening the convergence of the two courts’ case-law96 but it ended up determining 
a situation of fragmentation. 
 In light of the above, the IACtHR concluded that Chile did violate the principle 
of non-discrimination based on the sexual orientation of Mrs Atala Riffo.97 
In addition, the IACtHR ruled that such a decision amounted to a violation of the 
right to privacy and family life, setting a very broad and progressive understanding of 
‘family’, going beyond the traditional and conservative concept, requiring the state to 
develop and strengthen, ’in the broadest possible terms’, the family unit. 98 
A very similar position, fully condemning discrimination based on sexual 
orientation, was held by the Court in its recent case, Angel Duque v Colombia. The case 
concerned the denial of the survival pension to Mr Duque after the death of his same-sex 
partner. The IACtHR, perfectly in line with the HRC, held that the state’s internal 
regulations providing the possibility to obtain a survivor’s pension only to heterosexual 
couples, without an objective and reasonable justification as to the reason for the 
differential treatment, was discriminatory and contrary to the right to equality.99 The 
IACtHR acknowledged the fact that Colombia was pursuing the aim of protecting the 
family as a fundamental basis of society. However, while legitimate in theory, the 
difference in treatment could not be considered proper, as the concept of family cited by 
the state is limited and stereotyped, arbitrarily excluding different types of families such 
as those formed by same-sex partners.100 In addition, the IACtHR held that a lack of 
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consensus among its member states, the so-called regional consensus, about the rights of 
sexual minorities does not prevent it from deciding the issue.101  
7. A Fragile Convergence: the Threat of Fragmentation  
The above analysis shows that, while on the surface there is a general convergence in the 
approach to sexual orientation issues in the case-law of regional courts and the HRC, a 
deeper analysis reveals that a phenomenon of fragmentation is actually taking place and 
can increase due to a number of elements of fragility. 
Recalling the definition of judicial fragmentation as the phenomenon arising when 
two courts seized of the same (or similar) matter issue contrasting judgments,102 six 
remarks can be made, identifying some cases where fragmentation is already affecting 
sexual orientation rights at the international level and other elements that could further 
undermine convergence and similarly lead to fragmentation. 
First, the comparison between the notion of discrimination based on sexual 
orientation in the Inter-American and the European Court reveals a deep difference that 
can be considered an embryonal form of judicial fragmentation. On the one hand, the 
IACtHR ruled that for a violation of article 1 of the ACHR it is not necessary that the 
decision is ‘fundamentally and solely’ based on the person’s sexual orientation, as it 
would be enough to prove that the sexual orientation of the applicant has been taken 
somehow, implicitly or explicitly, into account. On the other hand, the ECtHR, in both 
Salguiero da Mouta and E.B., has reiterated the need to assess that the different treatment 
was ‘solely’ based on the sexual orientation of the applicant and that the latter was the 
‘decisive element’ of the deliberation in order to amount to a violation of article 14 of the 
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ECHR.103 This divergence, that in the practice has not yet produced any contrasting 
judgment, shows a different understanding of the notion and approach to the issue. 
According to the classical definition of judicial fragmentation, this difference in reasoning 
does not trigger fragmentation in the sense that it did not lead to contrasting judicial 
application of convention rights and, subsequently, contrasting outcomes. However, the 
two notions depart so much from each other that we can conclude that judicial 
fragmentation is partially affecting the interpretation of the prohibition of discrimination.  
A perusal of the previous case-law of the IACtHR on prohibition of discrimination 
shows that Atala Riffo is the first and only case where the Court adopted such a definition 
of different treatment for the sake of the application of article 1 of the ACHR. This finding 
leaves a veil of uncertainty about the actual approach of the IACtHR on the matter. On 
the one hand, it could be argued that this peculiar position is adopted only in cases of 
sexual orientation involving controversial domestic judgments and IACtHR did not have 
the possibility to apply it in further cases because it no other similar cases were brought 
before it. However, in Angel Duque v Colombia no mention can be found of this new 
approach toward discrimination. On the other hand, this innovative stance on the 
definition of discrimination could be the result of an attempt by the IACtHR to explore 
alternative interpretation paths. Yet, it is still an embryonal stage that does not allow 
further speculation. Moreover, it should be acknowledged that the ECtHR has elsewhere 
stated that it would review indirect discrimination as rigorously as it reviews direct 
discrimination,104 thus stepping closer to the IACtHR’s approach. However, these cases 
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do not concern sexual orientation and they do not allow us to make any conclusive 
inferences.  
Second, the case-law of regional bodies and of the HRC shows that the ground of 
discrimination under which ‘sexual orientation’ should fall is still debated. Sometimes 
falling under ‘sex’, some others under the very broad ‘other status’ or ‘any status’, this 
ambiguity may potentially generates misunderstanding in the nature of the discrimination.  
Third, the case-law on the right to marry reveals that while there is a strong 
convergence on the absence of a right to marry for same-sex couple, there is still lot of 
confusion on whether should be considered discriminatory a different treatment between 
a married heterosexual couple and a same-sex couple unable to marry. The ECtHR seems 
firm in excluding such a possibility,105 while the HRC, in its General Comments and in 
the concurring opinion in Joslin v New Zealand, leaves a door open to it.106 
Fourth, the concept of ‘family unit’ as including same-sex couples in a de facto 
relationship, even when the right to marry is not involved, is still not fully established. 
Indeed, the concurring opinion in X. v Colombia before the HRC107 and the close vote in 
X and Others v Austria before the ECtHR108 show that the progressive understanding of 
the notion of ‘family’ is highly debated and often questioned even when it is not related 
to the right to marry or to adopt. 
Fifth, the ECtHR and the IACtHR adopted a different approach to the so-called 
‘regional consensus’. On the one hand, for the ECtHR the existence of a regional 
consensus, especially on sensitive matters like marriage and adoption, is a key element 
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for deciding in favour of the applicant.109 On the other hand, the IACtHR has openly 
stated that the absence of a regional consensus among its member states does not prevent 
the court from interpreting the Convention in a certain way.110 This divergence of 
behaviour is strictly linked to the use by the ECtHR of the margin of appreciation.111 
Indeed, when the ECtHR found no regional consensus on a matter, it usually granted a 
wide margin of appreciation to its member states.112 It repeatedly held that, where a 
difference in treatment is based on sex or sexual orientation, the state’s margin of 
appreciation is narrow113 and differences that are based solely on considerations of sexual 
orientation are unacceptable under the Convention114 and no margin of appreciation 
should be granted. However, in the cases concerning the right to marry for same-sex 
couples, the ECtHR did grant a very wide margin of appreciation to the states. The 
opposite attitude of the IACtHR, ignoring the regional consensus on such matter and 
never recurring to the margin of appreciation, can be considered as a further element of 
weakness of the current convergence of case-law. Indeed, the IACtHR, when seized of a 
matter like marriage for same-sex couples with no regional consensus on its regulation, 
could freely rule in a very progressive way, thus contrasting with the position of the 
ECtHR.115 
As for the two other bodies, the element of consensus has not been invoked yet in 
cases on sexual orientation. For the HRC is very challenging to assess the existence of a 
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consensus of its member states in such a sensitive issues, being 116 the countries that 
accepted the jurisdiction of the committee over individual complaints. Moreover, in 
Toonen, the Committee held that ‘moral justification cannot be considered as a matter 
exclusively for domestic concern’ as such an approach would open the door to removing 
the Committee’s supervisory role’.116 As for the African Commission, the role of 
consensus in its ruling has been very limited so far.117 While in one case it stated that ‘the 
African Charter should be interpreted in a culturally sensitive way, taking into full 
account the differing legal traditions of Africa and finding expression through the laws 
of each country’,118 the Commission never followed this approach and even when it 
granted a margin of appreciation, it did so without assessing the existence or the lack of 
a regional consensus.119  
Lastly, the prohibition of discrimination based on sexual orientation within the 
African system is still a debated matter. All regional systems and the UN HRC provide 
the possibility for their Commissions and Courts to offer their good service to the parties 
with the aim of reaching a ‘friendly settlement’.120 The successful attempt of the African 
Commission to induce the applicant to withdraw his complaint in Courson v Zimbabwe 
is an extreme example of it.121 In view of the explicit consideration of the Commission’s 
rapporteur for the case, we can conclude that this was definitely an effective way for 
avoiding a judicial fragmentation that would have otherwise arisen. As previously 
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observed, if the Commission had to issue a view on that, it would have been most 
probably contrasting with the existent regional and international case-law. Given the 
attitude so far of the African Commission on sexual orientation matters, it is not hard to 
imagine that a strengthening of the African system, together with a rise in the number of 
cases related to sexual orientation brought to the attention of the Commission, may 
actually increase the chances of triggering judicial fragmentation. 
8. Conclusion  
Discrimination based on sexual orientation is generally considered a matter where, 
regardless of the important cultural, social, religious and political concerns, regional and 
international human rights bodies have reached a substantial convergence in their judicial 
application. The present study demonstrated that such convergence is more apparent than 
genuine and while it is true on the surface, a deeper analysis of the reasoning of the 
different bodies reveals that there are signs of current and potential fragmentation. 
As previously discussed, some of the key aspects related to discrimination based 
on sexual orientation and related rights like the right to marry or to have a family are still 
far from being settled and agreed upon. The difference in the notion of discrimination 
between the ECtHR and the IACtHR is certainly crucial and reveals a deep divergence in 
the approach toward the issue and could potentially lead to fragmentation in future 
discrimination cases, even beyond sexual orientation issues. In addition, the confusion on 
the interpretation of some notions, such as ‘family’, and on the approach to adopt in 
different circumstances, as in cases of adoption and social protection, are definitely 
potential threats to the existing fragile convergence. 
One of the main reasons behind the lack of a general and widespread 
fragmentation on the matter is the very low number of complaints brought before the 
regional bodies and the HRC. Especially in the case of the HRC, IACtHR, ACommHPR 
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and ACtHPR, the absence of applications on specific issues prevented them from 
adequately discussing the different matters and interpreting their respective conventions. 
Indeed, the impossibility of testing the approach of the different bodies on every specific 
matter is the biggest obstacle to a comprehensive and ultimate analysis on convergence 
and fragmentation. 
 In conclusion, the current overall convergence on sexual orientation rights should 
be welcomed as a confirmation of the universality of rights, but attention should be paid 
for future development which may lead to fragmentation, with the hope that subsequent 
harmonisation will not mean the affirmation of a lower standard of protection.  
 
 
